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 THE INTERWAR PERIOD AS A MACHINE AGE: MECHANICS, THE 
MACHINE, MECHANISMS AND THE MARKET IN DISCOURSE∗ 
Argument 
This paper examines some of the ways that machines, mechanisms and the 
new mechanics were treated in post World War I discourse. Spengler’s 1919 
Decline of the West and Hessen’s 1931 study of Newton have usually been tied 
closely to Weimar culture in Germany, and Soviet politics. Linking them also 
to the writings of Rathenau, Simmel, Chase, Mumford, Hayek and others, as 
well as to Dada and film studies of the city will indicate central features of a 
wide-ranging, international discourse on the machine and mechanisation. I 
argue that machines were so thoroughly integrated into social and economic 
experience that we can treat this as a distinctive new phase in the cultural 
history of mechanics, what some contemporaries called the “machine age”: a 
period in which rather than the hand mill or steam engine, the city stands as 
an appropriate realisation (and sometimes symbol) of the significance but also 
ambiguities and tensions of mechanical life; and concepts of mechanisation 
were extended to encompass the economy and market mechanisms. 
 
Two major events in the interwar period have strongly shaped our 
understandings of the social history of physics in particular and science and 
technology in general, while also playing signal roles in the development of 
the historiography of science and technology: Oswald Spengler’s publication 
                                                
∗ I would like to thank participants in Tel Aviv and Budapest workshops on Interactions of Interwar 
Physics: Technology, Instruments and Other Sciences for their helpful comments, and in particular 
Shaul Katzir, Karl Hall and two anonymous referees for their careful reading and many helpful 
suggestions. 
 3 
of Der Untergang des Abendlandes in 1918 and Soviet participation in the 1931 
Second International Congress of the History of Science in London. Each 
offers an instance in which accounts of physics were engaged in much 
broader understandings of the character of science. Spengler had challenged 
the role of mechanistic, causal physics in a declining western culture, while 
Soviet scientists and historians insisted on the mutual interrelations between 
technology and science, arguing that social and economic history determined 
the direction of science in trenchant discussions of both the current five-year 
plan and the roots of Isaac Newton’s work. Although these events have 
attracted diverse historiographical responses, prominent accounts have 
notably tied each to the specificities of time and place. Paul Forman’s 
influential if problematic argument that German physicists and 
mathematicians bowed to social pressure, not empirical demonstration, in 
accepting acausal physics depended critically on the view that the loss of the 
Great War rendered German scientists in the Weimar Republic uniquely 
vulnerable to such pressure (Forman 1971, Carson, et al. 2011). Similarly, in 
explaining the nature of modernisation in Germany, Jeffrey Herf has 
emphasised the peculiarity of what appear to be nearly paradoxical 
conservative, reactionary engagements with technology such as Spengler’s 
(Herf 1984). Likewise, while Gary Werskey’s studies of the Soviet Congress 
explored its importance in drawing a nascent group of British socialists into a 
collective biography, Loren Graham’s account of Boris Hessen’s notorious 
paper on Newton has emphasised its immediate social and political context, 
showing how Hessen’s argument about Newton could offer a defence against 
attacks on the bourgeois roots of Einstein’s relativity, and help protect his 
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own position in the strongly ideological environment of the Stalinist state 
(Werskey 1988, Graham 1985).  
This paper will link these two episodes, usually discussed in isolation, 
through their common engagement in issues surrounding mechanics and 
concepts of mechanisation. One way of reaching beyond the ineluctable 
specificities of case studies is to examine what contemporaries themselves 
regarded as general, and I shall here argue for the value of following many 
interwar commentators in considering the interwar period as a new age of the 
machine. Although historians have sometimes drawn attention to this term, it 
has most often functioned somewhat loosely as a descriptive label for the 
flowering of technologies and mass consumption in the period, pointing to 
the diverse ideological stances engaged and discerning a “machine-age 
modernism,” in the ways that Europeans combined Fordism with social-
democratic politics and Americans developed revolutionary modernism and 
skyscraper commerce (Jordan 1994, Rodgers 1998, ch. 9 on 407). I will instead 
focus more closely on the terms in which the machine, mechanics and 
mechanism were themselves discussed, in order to draw out several 
significant features of an inevitably profuse and tangled discourse on 
modernity. 
It is especially important to recognise the material and metaphorical breadth 
of concepts of mechanisation in this period. Materially, machines had long 
driven trains and powered factories but now also delivered electricity into 
both homes and factories, and the production of an increasing number of 
goods had been mechanised: glass-bottle and bulb blowing, bread baking and 
milk production, for example. I will argue that a new pervasiveness subtly 
 5 
changed the social and conceptual significance of mechanism. Metaphorically 
the machine could symbolise both the progress and the dread of modern life 
and its warfare. In addition to engineering mechanisms and the mechanical 
theories of physics, natural selection counted as a biological mechanism and 
artists spoke of mechanical art while prices and markets were accorded new 
generality as economic mechanisms. A second distinctive feature is the 
explicitly international terms in which discourse on the machine was 
pursued, as I will document by linking debates in Germany with perspectives 
on industrial health offered in the U.S. and Britain as well as the Soviet Union. 
A final major concern is to show significant respects in which discussions of 
the machine age were framed historically, consistently looking back both to 
benchmark achievements like the scientific and industrial revolutions or the 
rise of the bourgeoisie – and also to significant authorities like John Stuart 
Mill and Karl Marx – in ways that strongly emphasise the longevity of the 
terms of reference invoked in discourse on mechanisation. But if the terms of 
reference remained similar, the profusion of kinds of mechanism was 
distinctive. While contemporaries often pointed to the significance of Ford 
and Fordism, and historians of science have typically focused on the rise of 
automata and robots in considering mechanical man, I will argue that the 
possibility of seeing the city as a machine (and organism) is a still more 
revealing feature of mechanism in the interwar period – as long as we 
recognise both the ambiguities that attended the sometimes surprising 
conjunctions of social settings and material systems that met on city streets, 
and the tensions between analytic and projective perspectives that were 
sustained in some of the most fruitful and critical invocations of the city as 
machine. 
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I will develop my account in three stages, first drawing out several revealing 
invocations of mechanisms and the machine in Germany and the United 
States, in order to establish the range of references engaged, the changing 
valence accorded machines, and the terms in which contemporaries described 
what they saw as the emergence of a new and international discourse, in 
which the figure of the engineer was especially important as the potential 
master of modern society. I will then explore a number of artistic and film 
renderings of mechanical life in the interwar period in order to build an 
understanding of the complex senses in which the city was beginning to be 
described as a machine. My final section turns to the tensions between ideal 
and generality engaged in discussions of mechanisms and the economy. 
The machine age 
In Seeing Like A State, James C. Scott has written that if you were to look for a 
moment and a man to mark the “birth” of high modernism in the twentieth 
century, it would be German mobilisation in World War I and the person 
most responsible for it, the German-Jewish industrialist Walther Rathenau 
(Scott 1998, 97-98). As we shall see, Rathenau also offers a suggestive key to 
conceptual perspectives on mechanism. Trained in physics, philosophy and 
chemistry in Berlin and Strassburg, as well as in machine construction in the 
Technische Hochshule in Munich, from the 1890s Rathenau accepted increasing 
responsibility in AEG, the electrotechnical firm that his father Emil had 
founded. Walther helped pioneer the formation of cartels and syndicates to 
decrease competition amidst economic difficulties, and while AEG 
collaborated with Peter Behrens to develop industrial design in the early 
1900s, Rathenau’s pen brought him widespread notice. His 1912 book Zur 
Kritik der Zeit met the promise of its title with a diagnosis of the present that 
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was comprehensive and capacious, yet discriminating (Rathenau 1925 [1912], 
Volkov 2012). Joining a long tradition, Rathenau pointed to a pervasive 
condition or form of expression that he described as “mechanisation.” Having 
noted that mechanisation had first been felt in the production of goods, but 
had necessarily ramified dramatically given the centrality of production to all 
material life, Rathenau carefully picked out a long series of its present 
characteristics: 
To the economist it appears as mass production and distribution 
of goods; to the industrialist as division of labour, accumulation 
of labour, and manufacture; to the geographer as the 
development of means of transportation and communication, 
and colonisation; to the technician as the control of natural 
forces; to the scientist as the application of the results of 
research; to the sociologist as the organisation of labour; to the 
business man as enterprise and capitalism; to the politician as 
realistic economic and political statecraft. (Rathenau 1925 [1912], 
48) 
Yet Rathenau went on to point to a singular spirit that he thought was 
common to all these diverse characterisations, distinguishing them from 
earlier forms of life. They betrayed, he wrote, 
an impulse of specialisation and abstraction, of standardised 
thinking devoid of surprise and humour, of complicated 
uniformity; a spirit which seems to justify the name 
mechanisation even when applied to the sphere of emotion.  
(Rathenau 1925 [1912], 48) 
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Of course machines and mechanisation have long and vital histories, with 
historians of science tracing their investigations of mechanical philosophies at 
least as far back as the early modern period (Bertoloni Meli 2006, Riskin 2015). 
Recently, historians of literature and science have argued that we should 
recognise important precedents to post World War II treatments of 
cybernetics and cyborgs in the prosthetic engagement of Victorians with 
machines as living forces, diverse treatments of mechanism in biological 
thought in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, and new forms of 
automata such as the robots that Karel Čapek introduced to the stage in 1920 
(Ketabgian 2011, 1-6, McLaren 2012, Riskin 2015, see also Ruse 2005) The 
varied and above all practically realised forms of mechanisation that 
Rathenau identifies usefully complement this focus on biological mechanism 
and bodily hybridity. Note in particular that Rathenau links the physical 
machines of industrialisation and its products to a diverse array of social 
practices and disciplinary engagements, each approached somewhat 
differently, yet complexly uniform. We might think of these as the sinews of a 
new material and social hybridity. The capaciousness of this list, its careful 
distinctions between interrelated facets and Rathenau’s critical perspective all 
point to significant features of what mechanisation was beginning to mean in 
Germany. His list also reflects the organisational qualities Rathenau brought 
first to his firm and industry, and later to Germany through his role in the 
War Raw Materials Department, and subsequent ministerial appointments. 
That along with industrialists Rathenau could include academic roles such as 
geographers and sociologists and point to so many different perspectives 
surely reflects the Streit über Technik that had emerged around the claim of 
engineers for cultural and professional recognition, formalised in the right 
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that Technische Hochschulen gained in 1899 to award doctorates. Along with 
measures to reform secondary schooling and mathematics teaching, the 
Kaiser’s decree opened debate on the role of technology to diverse scholarly 
audiences, with a flurry of contributions from historians, engineers, scientists, 
and sociologists, and repeated recourse to the title that put everything on the 
line: “Technik und Kultur” (which the elite association of academically 
trained engineers adopted when renaming their journal in 1922). Together 
with Rathenau’s colleague the engineer Wichard von Moellendorf (who drew 
on the work of the historian Karl Lamprecht and the sociologist Georg 
Simmel to discuss the economic role of the engineer), such culturally 
renowned and academically powerful figures as the economic historian 
Werner Sombart, the physical chemist Wilhelm Ostwald and the historical 
sociologist Max Weber took part. Their contributions explored long-term 
historical origins for the central roles at issue – such as capitalist and 
entrepreneur – as often as they set out critical relationships between different 
disciplines and sectors of society (Mayer 1906, Sombart 1911, Ostwald 1909, 
Moellendorff 1912, 1913). Sombart provides an important example. In Der 
moderne Kapitalismus (1902) and Der Bourgeois; zur Geistesgeschichte des 
modernen Wirtschaftsmenschen (Sombart 1913, 426-27) he offers an account of 
the importance of technical inventions and all the industries involved in 
machine manufacture as a nursery of the capitalist spirit; Karl Hall has argued 
that he wrapped a stereotypical image in the individuality of the master 
artisan (Hall Forthcoming 2017?). In this context Rathenau’s discussions 
represent something of a literary flowering with a distinctly emotive and 
affective cast, but the call he uttered for a new birth of the soul was far from 
rare. Historians have most often been concerned with the changing 
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understandings of technology at issue, and with discussions of the cultural 
role and social identity of engineers; see for example the fine comparative 
studies presented in (Hård and Jamison 1998, Hård 1998). Rathenau was 
perhaps the most prominent example of the increasing extent to which 
engineers, technical physicists and industrialists now claimed cultural 
significance with a place interpreting the tenor of the times (as well as making 
it). 
For many World War I came to represent a particularly strong example of the 
characteristics that Rathenau had discerned, especially as its conflicts 
extended from weeks to months to years – and this decisively changed the 
valence of mechanism as a metaphorical diagnosis of the system or the spirit 
of the age. If Rathenau had sold thousands of copies of Zur Kritik der Zeit, 
Oswald Spengler’s 1918 Der Untergang des Abendlandes created a sensation 
and was still more enveloping in its often bitter discussion of the ills of 
mechanisation. Drawing out the peculiar role of physics in Spengler’s thought 
will show how his commentary shifted between physics and mechanics as an 
image of the intellectual world and source of social analogies, to the machine 
and the engineer (not entrepreneur) as key to the future of technology. 
Spengler thought he could pick out an understanding of the world as history 
from the world of nature in a way that others had only been able to glimpse 
dimly; and he described himself as separating the two possible ways of 
possessing and experiencing the environment: “the organic from the 
mechanistic world impression.” Spengler’s study of world history would 
distinguish: 
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the inner concept of form from that of the law, the image and 
symbol from the formula and system, the singular reality from 
the permanently possible, the goal of the tactically ordered 
imagination from that of the purposely decomposed experience, 
or, to identify here an unprecedented, highly important 
antithesis, the region of validity of the chronological from that of 
mathematical number. (Spengler 1919 [1918], 7) 
Thus Spengler offered a new, morphological kind of history built on analogy 
and symbol, arguing that until now history had taken its model from the 
physical sciences.  
Spengler’s understanding of the physical sciences was idiosyncratic, but 
based on the 1904 doctoral dissertation he wrote on Heraclitus under the neo-
Kantian philosopher Alois Riehl. Spengler offered parallels between 
Heraclitus’s views and the energetics of Ostwald and Mach, celebrating what 
he saw as Heraclitus’s rare insight into the inner relationship between culture 
and nature, with all cultural forms – the state, society, customs, intuitions – 
depending on nature. As a product of nature, they too were subject to the 
necessity of change. Spengler regarded the role of resistance and the 
equilibrium of opposing tensions in energetic considerations as analogous to 
the significance of war in man’s existence (Spengler 1904, 30). He also 
articulated a concept of form based on the mathematical laws of nature, 
writing of the possibility of determining natural phenomena purely 
numerically without postulating an “essence,” using Hertz’s electromagnetic 
theory of light as an example; and distinguishing between the way that 
materialistic science treated matter and energy and the rather different 
distinction between substance and form that Heraclitus and the energeticists 
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drew (Spengler 1904, 39-40). Spengler’s early work thus indicates close 
familiarity with significant aspects of the physics of his period. One corollary 
is that Spengler’s concepts of science and society drew on a heritage that he 
shared with many of the scientists who commented on his later work. In turn, 
their complex responses to Spengler’s writings reflected this common ground 
in what John Heilbron has described as Fin de Siècle descriptionism, as much 
as it does any capitulation to external social forces, in the way that Forman 
depicted the phenomena in the 1970s (Staley 2008, Carson, et al. 2011, Wise 
2011). 
By 1918, Spengler offered a symbolic understanding of form and had inverted 
his perspective on nature and culture to present a determinedly historical 
understanding of both, while offering a stark portrait of the Faustian power 
expressed in what he called “the machine.” Now Spengler argued “no science 
is only system, only law, number and order.” Rather the science of each era, 
the Greek period or his own, was a historical phenomenon, an organism 
determined by fate and culture: “In modern physics there lies not only a 
logical but also a historical necessity. It is not only a matter of intelligence but 
also of race” (Spengler 1919 [1918], 531). 
Spengler began his discussion of physics by recalling Helmholtz’s famous 
1869 account of the mechanical goals of science, and then contrasting the 
perspective that a physicist would take on mechanics with that of a sceptic 
aware of the psychology of the scientific conviction in mechanical 
explanation, writing “To the one, present-day mechanics is a logical system of 
clear, unambiguous concepts and of relations as simple as they are necessary; 
while to the other it is an illusion characteristic of the structure of the 
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Western-European spirit” (Spengler 1919 [1918], 528). If Spengler thought the 
physicists’ view of mechanics was illusory, Jeffrey Herf has shown that in 
1922 Spengler pronounced the machine to be the devil – but also argued that 
technology expressed the Faustian will to power over nature. Exuding a 
primordial violence and steely energy, Spengler thought western technology 
was much more active than previously – the machine had now taken on a life 
of its own (Spengler 1923 [1922], 1,187, as cited in Herf 1984, 60-61 on 61). 
Herf argues persuasively that nevertheless Spengler was much more worried 
by finance and the role of the merchant than machine technology itself. For 
Spengler, both industry and agriculture were rooted in the soil and blood and 
involved in a pitched battle with finance and the money thinking of banks 
and the stock exchange, which reflected the primordial struggle between 
creative production and economic plunder. Thus for Spengler both the 
entrepreneur and the industrial proletariat were enslaved to technology, and 
hopes for technology must instead rest in the guidance that could be provided 
by the engineer, “the erudite priest of the machine.” (Spengler 1923 [1922], 
1,191, as cited in Herf 1984, 62). 
Both Rathenau and Spengler focused on Germanic culture and the German 
state in their descriptions of the cast of characters involved in the industrial 
life of the present. They were in part engaged in showing how despite the war 
and the recognised economic strengths of the “American system of 
manufacture,” the German state was uniquely fit to create the conditions for a 
true industrial life (Hård 1998, see also Jakobsen, et al. 1998). Rathenau 
reassessed his earlier emphasis on industry groups and disdain of the cultural 
impact of excessive production; the war showed him the need for increased 
production but also rationalisation and national endeavour. As it concluded 
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he first embarked on a writing programme, arguing in a pamphlet on the 
Kaiser that long before war broke out the conditions for it had been created 
by a “dehumanised, overmechanised” and selfish Europe, carving up the map 
with cynical economic and armament policies (Rathenau 1919, 47, Volkov 
2012, 181-82). Despite the contradictions inherent in his position he moved 
into the Weimar government. As Foreign Minister negotiating to manage 
Versailles reparations with Western powers and, controversially, the Soviets, 
in 1922 he was murdered by members of the ultra-right nationalist 
Organisation Consul, who hoped to incite a civil war; Falk Müller’s 
contribution to this issue explores the further development of his company 
(Müller 2018?). 
The academic culture of Germany had clearly devoted unusually sharp 
attention to questions surrounding technology, and the costs of controversial 
stances could be especially extreme when coming up against diverse 
assessments of national needs in the political and economic crisis of the early 
Weimar republic. But similar issues were faced in many different countries 
and the work of a group of American social theorists, writers and 
commentators will demonstrate an increasingly international discourse. Most 
prominent amongst them were the economist and sociologist Thorstein 
Veblen, the economist Stuart Chase and the literary critic and historian Lewis 
Mumford. Veblen and Mumford have attracted far more attention than 
Chase, largely because of the importance of Veblen’s 1921 book The Engineers 
and the Price System for the technocracy movement and the reputation 
Mumford’s monumental 1934 Technics and Civilisation won, often described as 
the most influential twentieth century history of technology (Veblen 1963 
[1921], Chase 1929, Mumford 2011 [1934]). Most commentary has explored 
 15 
these figures’ understandings of technology, but as we shall see their 
thoughts were often framed in the language of the machine and Chase’s 1929 
book Men and Machine did more than any other to make this explicit. 
In her study of changing perspectives on technology in the U.S., Ruth 
Oldenziel shows that the rather mixed and inclusive nineteenth century 
understandings of the nature of the industrial arts and participation in them 
were narrowed significantly in Veblen’s 1921 treatment of technology as the 
preserve of engineers. Veblen gendered machines male while offering an 
encompassing metaphorical understanding of the industrial system as a self-
generative, self-contained machine, writing “The industrial system is notably 
different from anything that has gone before. It is eminently a system, self-
balanced and comprehensive, and it is a system of interlocking mechanical 
processes, rather than of skilful manipulation. It is mechanical, rather than 
manual.” (Veblen 1963 [1921], as cited in Oldenziel 1999, 45-46). More 
recently, Eric Schatzberg has explored Veblen’s reading of Sombart, Simmel 
and others, and charted the subtle transformation of understandings of 
technology reflected in Veblen’s use of specific concepts of “technology” as a 
translation of the German term “Technik.” Schatzberg notes Veblen’s 
sophisticated discussion of social dimensions of technology and subtle 
account of the relations between science and technology, arguing that few 
could follow the latter. Veblen thought industrial operations had to be 
understood as a “machine process” that interrelated multiple mechanical 
operations in one whole. Technology was not the system itself but its physical 
principles understood as the collective and cumulative knowledge of the 
industrial arts. That it could effectively be monopolised when ownership 
controlled the material means of utilising this knowledge was central to a 
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critique of capitalism. First articulated in articles published in 1906, by 1921 
Veblen had conjoined his critique with an argument for a new “Soviet of 
technicians” or “production engineers.” By being free of pecuniary interest, 
Veblen argued they could direct industrial development appropriately, a 
stance that proved controversial and might have seemed particularly utopian 
in post-war America. Schatzberg laments the conceptual elisions that 
occurred when later authors conflated the sense of technology as the study of 
a field, with technology as the object of study. Having limited his focus to the 
scholarly uses of “technology,” primarily in the social sciences, Schatzberg 
notes that a more complete account of the cultural dimensions of technology 
would have to follow Oldenziel’s lead in examining “the full range of terms – 
such as the machine and science – that were used to discuss the material culture 
of modernity” (Schatzberg 2006, 488, 2012, see also Jamison 1998). 
Chase was an associate of Veblen’s who joined him as a member of the 
Technical Alliance from 1919 to 1921. In 1927 he published on money and 
advertising, before visiting Soviet Russia as a member of the First American 
Trade Union Delegation and co-authoring a report on the nation’s second 
decade. This experience gave him the trope of imagining what it would be 
like to transpose a Russian urchin to New York, supposing for a moment he 
became a talented scientist, “a generic figure for the scientist and engineer, 
familiar with the main aspects of modern technology and capable of 
operating its mechanical devices.” This was how the opening chapter of Men 
and Machines framed its study of the way machines had banished past 
biological limitations. Chase described the great extension of physical and 
mental capacities in telescope, microphone, radio, the electron tube 
micrometer and the MIT integrating machine, and contrasted what a man’s 
 17 
back could carry with the power of a crane and steam hammer; yet also noted 
that one “would take no peasant from his village in the certainty of making 
him happier in New York” (Chase 1929, 7 and 9). 
Raising the question whether we are enslaved by our machines, Chase ran 
through representative groups of writers who railed against machines, 
celebrated them, or sat on the fence, helpfully giving some measure of the 
field of discourse. As well as Spengler, amongst those indicting the machine 
Chase described the views of a group of American and British authors with 
several scientists amongst them: Samuel Butler, Austin Freeman, Henry P. 
Frost, Frederick Soddy, J.B.S. Haldane, Bertrand Russell, Philip Gibbs, 
Benjamin Disraeli and H.G. Wells. That group was larger than those he listed 
in favour or undecided combined. Although Chase thought he could have 
multiplied each list endlessly (in the same proportions), he also commented 
that all of these views had been given in summary form, with the possible 
exception of Freeman’s (Chase 1929, 9-19). Indeed Freeman’s 1921 book Social 
Decay and Regeneration had offered lengthy descriptions and detailed analysis. 
He regarded machines as concrete expressions of knowledge and thought 
their evolution showed mechanism had a life of its own, “as an independent 
entity governed by its own laws and having no necessary connection with 
human needs or human welfare” (Freeman 1921, 84). Freeman characterised 
the effects of mechanism on itself, on the human environment, the social 
organism collectively, and on the individual, before outlining a set of 
consequent social anti-bodies and offering a eugenic solution. But his analytic 
care was exceptional: few had written fully enough to give Chase a 
satisfactory understanding of why they thought as they did. 
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So Chase offered an anatomy of machines as well as a historical perspective 
on their development. Drawing on the international success of Karel Čapek’s 
1920 play depicting synthetic organic automatons rebelling against humanity 
(discussed in (Riskin 2015, ch. 9)), Chase wrote on robots, but also on skills, 
saving labour, the flood of goods, skyscrapers, and playgrounds, to list just 
some of his chapters. He thought power machinery belonged in making other 
machines and glass and bottle making, for example, but not in fine bread 
making or ornamental metal work. A judicious recognition of the limitations 
of technology was necessary and machines should not be blamed for the 
cheap and nasty stuff they were used to produce (Chase 1929, 238-39). As the 
U.S. moved into depression, Chase brought his analysis to bear on public 
policy, noting in the preface to his 1932 book A New Deal that progressively 
advancing towards “an all-inclusive mechanical balance,” the industrial 
system was approaching a critical tipping point, and the “mechanical state of 
the industrial arts” could no longer be served by the control of production in 
the hands of vested interests. Like Veblen before him, Chase’s solution was 
technocratic: to entrust control to production engineers without commercial 
interests. Linking a sharp analysis of industrial and economic problems to 
such general ideas as the machine and technology in addressing critical 
unemployment issues won him favour, but also proved problematic. While 
Franklin D. Roosevelt adopted Chase’s title in his acceptance of the 
Democratic nomination for president in the summer of 1932 and Chase 
became part of his inner circle, the technocracy movement that Chase 
represented was attacked by physicists, engineers and business leaders like 
Karl T. Compton, Arthur Sheridan and Arthur D. Little, who belittled the 
novelty of the analysis and sought to break the links that Veblen and Chase 
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had made between technocracy and engineering as a profession and between 
technocracy and technology (or machines) as the product of engineers’ work 
(Oldenziel 1999, 47-48, see also Bix 2000). Yet David Hart’s account of the 
varieties of liberalism in play in U.S. science and technology policy highlights 
the role of metaphors of the machine and the ideal of developing an 
administrative state “as precise and powerful as an automobile engine,” in 
the words of Roosevelt’s Secretary of Agriculture, Henry Wallace (Hart 1998, 
62-71 and 78, quote on 62). Thus many shared language of this kind while 
disagreeing on where control should be vested; notably in the early phases of 
Roosevelt’s administration the MIT president Compton sought to enlarge the 
understanding of “public works” to include science even if he resisted ceding 
control to engineers. 
Soon the encompassing nature of Chase’s concern with the machine had been 
matched and then exceeded by Lewis Mumford, who toured American and 
European museums of science and industry and wrote drafts of what would 
later be published as Technics and Civilization in 1930 and 1931. Mumford saw 
the key to an ability to “transvalue” the machine to lie in the observation that 
many of the most important new developments in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century had come in part from the study of physiology and 
anatomy and intimate work with the human voice, eye and ear. The 
telephone, phonograph and motion picture represented machine technique 
approaching the organic, and indeed recovering elements that Mumford 
thought had been repressed in earlier phases of the development of the 
machine, which had failed to recognise or turned away from the moral and 
social problems involved in their development. Thus Mumford set the 
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machine in a matrix in which understanding it was a critical means to 
understanding both society and self (Mumford 1934, 4-7). 
Mumford linked science and technics closely, writing that the concept of a 
neutral world, a new objectivity, had relied upon the combination of the 
scientific method and the machine technique, emerging only in the nineteenth 
century, and he was particularly interested in what this meant for man’s 
character. In this respect, Mumford argued: 
In the development of the human character we have reached a 
point similar to that we have attained in technics itself: the point 
at which we utilise the completest developments in science and 
technics to approach once more the organic. But here again: our 
capacity to go beyond the machine rests in our power to assimilate the 
machine. Until we have absorbed the lessons of objectivity, 
impersonality, neutrality, the lessons of the mechanical realm, we 
cannot go further in our development toward the more richly organic, 
the more profoundly human. (Mumford 1934, 363) 
Historians discussing these authors have commonly picked out a handful of 
their contributions for closer analysis. On the one hand these have often been 
pursued with an overarching concern for two rather general themes. They 
have been linked to modernity (and anti-, reactionary- or more recently post-
modernity); or they have been pursued with the boundary work of science 
studies in mind, considering the relations or distinctions between “science” 
and “technology” and between “pure” and “applied” endeavours, chasing 
terms still at work in our analysis today (Herf 1984, Hård and Jamison 1998, 
Schatzberg 2006, 2012, Forman 2007). And on the other hand historians have 
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often resolved the work of these authors into quite local cultural 
environments, with Jeffrey Herf tying his account of reactionary modernism 
strongly to the specificities of the political and cultural situation of the 
Weimar Republic, for example.  
Taking them up in this paper with the explicitly comparative perspectives 
explored fruitfully by the contributions to Hård and Jamison’s edited volume 
on the appropriation of technology – but approaching them instead through 
the differently resonant concept of the machine – has shown that this term 
changed valence in the period before and after World War I, but also that for 
several thinkers in the interwar period “the machine” became an overarching 
concept encompassing significantly interrelated elements of the technical and 
social dimensions of the industrial economy. As Rathenau’s comments 
suggest, it was multiply realised in a rich range of different forms of 
“mechanisation.” The machines and industries concerned were often 
electromechanical, reflecting the increasingly wide reach of electricity, and 
distinctions in types of power or locomotion were rarely emphasised. The 
boundary between the organic and the mechanical was often crossed – and 
sometimes this was regarded as critical to the proper rapprochement with the 
machine.  
Considering even this relatively small group of German and American 
authors we have also seen the possibility of tracing concepts of the machine 
and mechanisation across diverse international contexts. Both the 
bibliographies and many of the central historical arguments of books like 
Rathenau’s, Spengler’s and Mumford’s aimed at characterisations of the 
centrality of machines to western culture. In taking up the relations between 
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technical and cultural achievement, the role of engineers and the state, and 
the possibility of the machine taking jobs, they addressed current political 
needs and also raised questions of vital interest in many other nations – which 
in turn often engaged them by drawing on their writings. A brief discussion 
of British and Soviet treatments of mechanisation will demonstrate this point, 
while also preparing ground for my analysis of artistic and economic work 
with the concept of mechanism in following sections. Daniel Wilson has 
recently traced a similar discursive context in Britain to J.A. Hobson’s ground-
breaking discussions of industrialisation in the late nineteenth century 
(Wilson 2015). In the 1920s, just as Chase noted the writings of many British 
commentators, the literary scholar F.R. Leavis and his colleagues in the 
Scrutiny movement drew on Chase when articulating an account of the 
changing nature of work. Hilliard describes them as using the machine as “a 
governing metaphor for modernity,” and Ketabgian has suggested that 
Leavis’s anti-industrialism has strongly shaped received views of the 
industrial psyche as stunted and dehumanised (Hilliard 2012, 57, 61-66 on 61, 
Ketabgian 2011, 7). Addressing the bureaucratic roots of computing in Britain, 
Jon Agar has shown that the governing metaphor for government was 
likewise mechanisation. In the 1920s and 30s in particular, Agar argues an 
“expert movement of mechanisers” helped secure Treasury control over the 
Civil Service through an Investigating section that promoted mechanisation in 
the treatment of records, tasks and files. Their aims were articulated in a 
memorandum that Major Sydney George Partridge sent to the Adjutant 
General in 1916, arguing “It is the aim of every alert organisation seeking 
efficiency and economy in office administration to strike the balance between 
the ‘human’ and the ‘mechanical,’ and the more efficiently a Department is 
 23 
organised the greater will be the tendency for the ‘mechanical’ to encroach on 
‘human’ territory” (Agar 2003, ch. 6, on 162). Vladimir Lenin’s organisational 
aims were still broader, while his methods were sharper. James C. Scott 
describes how his understanding of the vanguard party as the “machinery of 
revolution” went together with Lenin’s readiness to see the template for social 
change in electrification. Stephen Kotkin has developed a similar approach 
more comprehensively. In a brilliant comparative study of Soviet forms of 
modernity he argues that distinctive engagements with mass production, 
mass culture, mass politics – even mass consumption – served as integrating 
mechanisms in the Soviet Union, as they did amongst western nations (Scott 
1998, ch. 5, Kotkin 2001, 112-14) But closely engaged with important political 
aims as they were, such mechanisms – and even attitudes to the concepts of 
mechanics – were also advanced by contrast and threat as well as by 
persuasion and cooperation. Although celebrating the machine, like Spengler 
Lenin had engaged closely with physics in critiquing Mach for the supposed 
solipsism of his epistemology in 1909. This stance (and later Stalin’s views) 
strongly shaped the direction of ideological and philosophical critiques of 
physics in the Soviet Union through the 1920s and 30s, where a prominent 
member of a “mechanist” faction claimed the imprimatur of reductionist 
science and dialectical materialism in arguing against Einstein’s relativity for 
its idealism (Joravsky 1961, chs. 2, 10). This will help suggest the need to 
relate Soviet contributions to the International Congress in History of Science 
to international debates on mechanism and the machine question as well as to 
more immediate social and economic roots in factional Soviet politics. Boris 
Hessen and Nikolai Bukharin engaged Sombart, Spengler and Chase as well 
as Marx in developing their treatments of past and present relations between 
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machines and the social fabric of science and industrialisation, and they 
offered radically new accounts of scientific practice in doing so (Bukharin 
1931, Hessen 1931, Joffe 1931, Zavadovsky 1931, Werskey 1971, Kojevnikov 
2008). 
Mechanical art and film: The city as machine 
Having gained a detailed understanding of how mechanisation was discussed 
by those writers and commentators most directly responsible for depicting 
the interwar period as a machine age, we now turn to two different contexts 
in which highly creative treatments of mechanism were offered, considering 
mechanical art and film, and then economics. In both cases, I will argue, the 
profusion and pervasive nature of material mechanisms and forms of 
mechanisation helped promote the articulation of new and interrelated 
perspectives on the city and markets, in which forms of social mechanism 
were given new weight. The machine had long been the subject of artistic 
elaboration, and many amongst the avant-garde movements of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century worked with mechanomorphic images 
– Neue Sachlichkeit, Surrealism, Expressionism, Futurism – but they were 
taken up particularly strongly by those artists who joined the Dada Club in 
Berlin in the midst of World War I. Celebrating the language of their nation’s 
enemy they followed the lead of Cabaret Voltaire in Zürich in producing 
vibrant, confrontational performances and artwork of ab√surd_!troub|ing 
juxtapositions to critique artistic and social assumptions (Kuenzli 2011). 
Helmut Herzfeld took the name John Heartfield and described himself as the 
“Monteur” or engineer of Dada. Adopting collage and montage to make art of 
current news and improve on old and new masters, as the war ended Berlin 
Dadaists strewed their images with machine fragments, wheels and gears, 
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and cast both political leaders and the age in mechanical terms – yet 
themselves embraced the possibilities of mechanical art and machine-life 
hybridity. In 1920 Raoul Hausmann alternately critiqued and claimed the 
mechanical in evocatively symbolic works. In “Der eiserne Hindenburg,” the 
military leader is drawn in ink with mechanical limbs and body – but a 
human face and hands – and with a megaphone hanging from his hairy 
buttocks. Yet in “Selbstporträt des Dadasophen,” the photo-montaged image 
of the suited Dada protagonist has a pressure gauge and film projector for its 
head, and a diagrammatic lung, while the polished wooden tailor’s head of 
“Mechanischer Kopf (Der Geist unsere Zeit),” incorporates measuring tape, 
watch gears and wallet. These hybrid human forms combine elements more 
often associated with the cybernetics and cyborgs of the post World War II era 
(Biro 2009, 117-20), but Dada images of the social are as revealing.  
Consider the chaotic exuberance of George Grosz and Heartfield’s “Leben 
und Treiben in Universal-City, 12 Uhr 5 mittags,” which sets fragments of 
advertising and newsprint evoking American cinema into a tangled heap of 
drawing and caricature, together with a car wheel, a pocket watch, a strip of 
film, feet and faces: it is lunchtime in the film city (and Charlie Chaplin was a 
Dada hero). Hannah Höch rendered the social in more thoroughly political 
terms. Her monumental collage “Schnitt mit dem Küchenmesser, Dada durch 
die letzte Weimarer Bierbauchkulturepoche Deutschlands 1919/20,” offers 
deliberately profuse juxtapositions of politicians, soldiers, artists and others 
for and against Dada, with Einstein flanked by a gear and ball bearings, 
surmounted by an insect and train with the phrase “dada” (Henderson 2008, 
106-08, Makela 1997). Einstein’s opponents such as Paul Weyland eagerly 
noted such references and were inclined to interpret his success as merely 
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popular mass suggestion, fuelled by newspapers (Wazeck 2009, 2014, 219-26, 
van Dongen 2007). Ironically, like Dada artists those arguing against Einstein 
often celebrated mechanics, but in a traditional understanding that could be 
held against Einstein’s theory of relativity. 
The theatre of war had given a sense of the vulnerability of the body and led 
to art re-appropriating media images to fracture a discredited leader and 
show the newly famous in the broken masses of a volatile Republic. Film 
likewise could build commentary from collation, and it too was used to offer 
distinctive interpretations of mechanisation and machines, especially in a 
number of highly suggestive accounts of the city from the late 1920s. Two 
decades earlier the sociologist Georg Simmel had closely tied the metropolis 
to money and a new form of mental life, as expressions of the peculiarly 
abstract relations occasioned by the division of labour – which also afforded 
unusual individual freedom. Yet for Spengler the inorganic city was a symbol 
of the desiccation of the modern era. Similarly, filmmakers offered both 
celebratory exploration and starkly difficult images of the metropolis. Because 
Simmel’s perspective engages issues significant for later understandings of 
the economy and markets it will be helpful to outline it before considering 
several ground-breaking films. Bringing conceptual and artistic treatments of 
the city into contact can help us understand cultural grounds for newly 
general understandings of economic mechanisms. 
In 1903, Simmel described the central problems of modern life to stem from 
the need of the individual to preserve autonomy in the face of now 
overwhelming social forces, heritage, culture and technology (which his 2007 
translator rendered as “the technique of life”). If in the eighteenth century 
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freedom from the historical bonds of state, religion, morality and economic 
life had been highlighted, the nineteenth century had demanded a functional 
specialisation of life and work that made individuals incomparable, 
indispensable to one another, but also directly dependent on each other’s 
activities. Nietzsche’s response had emphasised individual struggle, while 
socialism sought to suppress competition; both responses pointed to the 
individual’s need to resist being levelled and worn out by what Simmel called 
“a social-technological mechanism” (Simmel 2007 [1903], 182-83). Simmel 
associated this phenomenon most strongly with the city, and what he 
described as “a money economy,” for the multiplicity and concentration of 
economic activity in the city had given the means of exchange an importance 
quite foreign to commerce in rural environments. Under primitive conditions 
production was bound in intimate personal relations. In contrast, the modern 
metropolis was largely supplied by production for the market, and Simmel 
thought this enhanced the abstract intellectualistic mentality that was the 
ideal of natural science. He also linked the distances and aversions, the 
rhythms of emergence and disappearance in city sociability with the extent to 
which the city granted individuals a kind and amount of personal freedom 
that had no analogy in other circumstances: the division of labour in this 
extended group both occasioned and necessitated a new, specific 
individuality (Simmel 2007 [1903], 184-85, 88-89). 
In the late 1920s a range of extraordinary documentary and narrative films 
portrayed and examined many of these themes in ways that highlight the 
shifting scales on which the city could be imagined as a machine. Walther 
Ruttmann’s documentary film of the course of a day in Berlin: Die Sinfonie der 
Grossstadt made art of the ordinary. Its opening scenes depict a steam train 
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and electrical power lines leading into/out of the city, and then near empty 
streets that gradually stir with people, before the factory machines start up, 
with glass, metal, milk and bread production all mechanised. The camera 
moves between diverse comings and goings on foot or by streetcar and bus, 
showing the factory at work, street scenes and construction sites, and cutting 
between fashionable Kurfürstendamm and the slum district. Ruttmann 
juxtaposes workers, horses, the wealthy, business men, and a lion all eating as 
if to emphasise a common need, without settling into a strong reading of their 
relations – and this is followed by images of mechanised washing up and a 
cat feeding on scraps. Newspapers are produced, wrapped, stacked, and sent 
to delivery with a series of words lifted from the rapid blur of newsprint 
pages: Krise (crisis), Mord (murder), Börse (stock-exchange), Heirat 
(marriage) and Geld (money, seven times) and then we are on a rollercoaster, 
in a revolving door, subject to vertiginous visual illusion amidst the solitude 
of a suicide attempt witnessed by masses. The film ends with Berlin’s streets 
lit by electric light, fireworks and a searchlight. Ruttmann thought of his task 
as musical, but the way he writes about the problems of editing leaves unclear 
whether he is referring to his subject matter or the artistic medium: “While 
preoccupied with the cutting of the film, I realised how difficult it was to 
achieve a symphonic ‘curve’ or form in the film. Many beautiful individual 
scenes had to be cut out to avoid the effect of a series of static pictures. The 
structure of such a complicated machine, in creating the desired movement 
and to make the heterogeneous episodes an organic whole, had to consist of 
related incidents fitted to each other which would grip one by their intensity” 
(Ruttmann 1928). In contrast to the delicate realisation of Ruttmann’s vision of 
the machine, the intense narrative drama of Fritz Lang’s Metropolis rendered a 
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city doubly fantastic, both myth-infused and birthing the modern post-human 
– or rather revealing its caricature in the machined mimicry of the human. Yet 
in Lang’s expressionist idiom the city dwarfs its divided peoples and is 
clearly dominated by the machine wrought into its centre. Bitter struggles 
between the head and hand see the destruction of the heart-machine, which 
has feasted on the bodies of the labourers that served it, but the promise of 
mediating hearts at least halts the wreckage of the city torn apart by its 
people. 
These 1927 films were followed in 1929 by Dziga Vertov’s brilliantly 
innovative documentary Man with a Movie Camera. This was shot for the 
Ukraine State Studio shortly after Vertov had finished The Eleventh Year 
(1928), a study of Soviet electrification that John Mackay describes as an 
“energetic montage” focused above all on process in “documenting humans 
and machines collectively overcoming nature’s stony inertia” (Mackay 2007, 
41). In his 1922 “We: Variant on a Manifesto” Vertov had described his task:  
Because people cannot control their movements, we will until 
further notice not include them as subjects in our films. 
Our way takes us through the poetic machine, from the 
corpulent gentleman to the perfect electric man. 
We reveal the soul of the machine, causing the worker to love 
his workplace, the peasant his tractor, the engineer his engine— 
We bring joy to mechanical labor, 
We make peace between man and machine, 
We train the new man. (Vertov, Kino-Eye 11 as cited in (Feldman 
2013 [1998], 21)). 
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Using the mechanical eye and the machine art of film to depict the life of a 
city and its people, Vertov fought for the complete separation of film from 
literary and theatrical languages, developing a sharply edited study with 
rapid shifts of perspective and interwoven rhythms, that deliberately 
constructed a series of analogies between audience and subject, camera and 
eye, people waking and an awakening city. Vertov switches between city 
bench and home, motor and factory, transport and rest, and builds and 
dissolves a set of contrasts, layering human, animal and mechanical motion 
into the same screen. This was an experiment in new kinds of cinematic 
communication without the help of subtitles, scenario or theatre; and Vertov’s 
radically reflexive authorial stance also dramatically highlighted the agency 
of the audience, left to experience a vision of the city without story. Later 
commentators have debated whether the city is portrayed as mechanical or 
organic, but the deep analogies that Vertov’s film vision capture and 
illuminate so self-consciously are surely more important than resolving this 
tension. His medium itself provides a machined enhancement, revealing 
illusions like split scenes of passing trains that mechanically enhance on the 
speed and intervals of physiological vision – and can be trusted because the 
viewer is shown how they are made (Cook 2007, Feldman 2013 [1998], Turvey 
2007). 
In 1936, Charlie Chaplin’s Modern Times joined the genre of film commentary 
on the city and factory machine with a clear political perspective rendered 
sharply comedic. Reportedly, the film owed its genesis and factory motif to 
the worldwide success of the lyrical City Lights in 1931, with its social 
inversions between the Millionaire and the Tramp (whose feet had briefly 
appeared on screen in Ruttmann’s movie) and a set echoing London, Paris 
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and Naples as well as Los Angeles. Soon after its Los Angeles premiere (with 
Albert and Elsa Einstein guests of honour), Chaplin toured depressed 
European cities to promote City Lights; discussing Mahatma Gandhi’s grim 
perspective on industrialisation prompted him to take on the machine. 
Fittingly, this backstory illustrates the international dimensions of the 
industrial modernism of Western cities. 
The shifting analytic perspectives of the documentary films Berlin: Die Sinfonie 
der Grossstadt and The Man with the Movie Camera seem to highlight the scale 
and pervasiveness of different forms of mechanisation, while Metropolis and 
Modern Times emphasize the breath-taking dominance and relentlessness of 
the machine. Each delivers a strikingly innovative vision of the machine in the 
city, but it was the artist, architect and urban planner Le Corbusier who 
sought to offer the epitome of the machine age city. Indeed, in 1927 Le 
Corbusier titled an early article “Toward a Machine Age Paris,” and he 
developed manifestos and plans dominated by the right angle, straight lines, 
and strict functional segregation to allow single purpose planning and 
standardisation in cities that might inspire the future. Scott’s Seeing Like a State 
offers a brilliant exposition of the influential extreme that Le Corbusier 
presents, sketching visions of the same radiant city to thoroughly transcend 
present day Moscow, then Paris, noting that when Le Corbusier did get the 
chance to build Chandigarh from Jawaharlal Nehru, residents had to build an 
unplanned periphery on the outskirts of the austere and monumental centre 
he constructed (Scott 1998, ch. 4). Collectively the diverse renderings of the 
city we have considered echo the wide span and heterogeneity of Rathenau’s 
diverse forms of mechanisation. But in suggesting that the city is an 
appropriate symbol of the machine age in the interwar period I do not mean 
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to argue that contemporaries took the city as a central metaphor for the 
machine, or that the period was defined by Le Corbusier’s singular projective 
visions, though these were important. Rather it is the fact that some saw the 
city as already a machine, its life pervasively run through by heterogeneous 
forms of mechanisation that is most revealing, for this offers a new and 
importantly ambiguous image of the social life of the machine (and this is 
characteristic of the age). 
The machine age in physics? 
Before exploring a correlate to this social life in concepts of economic 
mechanisms I want to take up (if briefly) an important responsibility. To 
examine what machines and mechanics meant within the physics discipline in 
the interwar period we would have to note the juxtaposition of two new 
forms of mechanics in relativity and quantum mechanics with the 
proliferation of versions of mechanics produced for applied mathematicians, 
mechanical engineers, and also physicists. In other words, a kind of discursive 
breadth of reference was already fostered for mechanics by the tremendous 
disciplinary and institutional diversification of physics (also exemplified by 
the contributions to this special issue). Texts on practical mechanics on the 
one hand, and the physics of the factory on the other were all represented in 
the pages of disciplinary and general scientific journals like Physikalische 
Zeitschrift and Nature. Take the example of one of the leading German physics 
publishers, the Leipzig firm S. Hirzel, whose advertisements in the 
Physikalische Zeitschrift (which it published) show that shortly before the 
confirmation of Einstein’s relativity Hirzel was offering for sale Philip 
Lenard’s book Über Relativitätsprinzip, Äther, Gravitation, and set its two Nobel 
prize winners Max Planck and Johannes Stark side by side in a single 
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advertisement, with three titles from Max Planck on Einfuhrung in die 
Allgemeine Mechanik, Einführung in die Mechanik deformierbarer Körper, and Die 
Stellung der neueren Physik zur mechanischen Naturanschauung (S. Hirzel Verlag 
1919). Hirzel also offered Gustav Winter’s book Der Taylorismus and 
published the journal Praktische Psychologie (or industrial psychotechnics), 
which Anson Rabinbach has shown expanded rapidly in the immediately 
post-war period (Rabinbach 1990). The vast majority of the firm’s Kollegien-
Hefte collection of textbooks and handbooks were devoted to machine 
elements, machine technology, technical mechanics, hydropower, light 
engines; that is, to mechanics in a great diversity of forms – which in many 
ways provides a disciplinary basis for, or at least a clear reflection of, the 
breadth of discourse that I have noted above (S. Hirzel Verlag 1920b). 
Similarly, just as Max Planck couched his discussions of the new physics in 
terms of the development of mechanical views of nature, the first seven pages 
of Einstein’s popular account of relativity deftly establish – with a rather light 
touch – a set of significant contexts in which to consider his work. The first is 
the school, with his discussion of Euclidean geometry and the open question 
of its empirical truth. The second is the city, with his reference to Potsdamer 
Platz in Berlin as an everyday example of how to specify an event in a system 
of reference. And the third is the railway, with his discussion of space and 
time in classical mechanics (Einstein 1917, 1-7). Thus Einstein’s account 
meshed rather neatly with the practical and metaphorical understandings of 
mechanisation in the period – something that was heightened still further in 
the opening segments of the experimental documentary film on relativity for 
which Einstein was a consultant, released in 1922 (Wazeck 2010). Yet his 
opponents often insisted on a more traditionally practical understanding of 
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mechanics. In the 1920 advertisement for a new, expanded edition of Philipp 
Lenard’s Über Relativitätsprinzip, Äther, Gravitation, it was noted that the 
author handled his subjects “from the standpoint of a natural scientist who 
feels themselves led more by the experience of the material world than by 
philosophical demands. He grounds his worldview not on mere mathematical 
equations, but on mechanisms. In this departure from the customary handling 
of the matter lies the high value of the book” (S. Hirzel Verlag 1920a, 
Hentschel 1990). As is well known, in the 1930s Lenard’s account was 
expanded to the point of vicious caricature in his four volume depiction of 
Deutsche Physik, this time with a different publisher (Lenard 1936, Hentschel 
1996, lxx-lxxviii). 
Mechanisms and the economy  
Having explored the development of a very general concept of “the machine” 
as a system in the previous sections, I wish to conclude by considering the 
origins of the sense in which we now speak of the economy in terms of 
market mechanisms. Recalling Rathenau’s 1912 treatment of mechanisation, it 
is worth emphasising that he described “the economist” as seeing 
mechanisation in mass production and the distribution of goods, without 
referring to markets. So when did economists or others first start to write of 
markets, mechanisms and the economy in the same breath, and what does it 
mean to think of market prices as a mechanism? This section contributes 
towards answering these questions by first outlining the pertinence of 
discourse on machines to a general concept of the economy, and then 
showing that the wide scope of this discourse was important for the 
economist Friedrich Hayek’s influential account of the roles of prices and 
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markets in the economy; but that he also undertook a deliberate attempt to 
reshape its metaphorical, connotative dimensions. 
In his study of the practices and concepts of capitalism as these were engaged 
in Egypt, Timothy Mitchell develops a view not unlike the perspective that 
Oldenziel and Schatzberg have taken to subtly changing concepts of 
technology, arguing that the general concept “the economy” only emerged in 
the English language in the late 1930s, with the contraction of empires and 
increasing isolation of countries feeling the effects of the Great Depression. 
Before this period the term referred to household stewardship or, as “political 
economy,” to management or public administration. While Simmel’s analysis 
of the city points to historical factors that could be significant for the 
emergence of a general concept of economy, it is telling that there Simmel 
himself always refers specifically to a money economy (sometimes in contrast 
to barter), and is equally specific in referring to metropolitan markets. Yet, as 
Mitchell shows, it has been easy for later authors to read back into Simmel’s 
writing broader concepts that were actually developed only somewhat later. 
While Edward Shils’s 1936 translation of the essay followed Simmel in using 
the indefinite article to refer to a money economy, in 1950 Gerth and Miller 
inserted the definite article in their translation, writing “The metropolis has 
always been the seat of the money economy” (Mitchell 2002, 80-81).  
Mitchell goes on to argue that a new, more general concept was developed by 
economists like John Maynard Keynes, in part as a result of their work 
managing the circulation of money in the enclosed geographical space of 
colonial India, which he writes led them to refer to the economy as “a self-
contained mechanism whose internal parts are imagined to move in a 
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dynamic and regular interaction, separate from the irregular interaction of the 
mechanism as a whole with what could now be called its exterior” (Mitchell 
2002, 82, 2005). If Mitchell is right about this, his argument points to a further 
significant dimension of the cultural history of concepts of mechanism I have 
been developing here. Mitchell never analyses mechanism in detail, but two 
revealing moments in his careful histories of colonization and economics 
underline this possibility. In Colonizing Egypt, Mitchell offers a telling account 
of the terms in which the Earl of Cromer described what he called the state 
machinery and political machinery of Egypt in the 1907 book Modern Egypt. 
There Mitchell argues that at the point at which Cromer described his own 
power as Consul General as mechanical, he resorted also to images of the 
body politic (Mitchell 1988, 159-60). Similarly, more recently Mitchell has 
shown that when supervising the cadastral survey of Egypt in the same 
period, Captain Henry Lyons described the survey as depending on “an 
almost mechanical system of work… carrying the principle of the division of 
labour to its extreme possible development” (Mitchell 2002, 89 and 119). After 
returning to Britain in 1907, Lyons served as director of the Science Museum 
in the period from 1920 to 1933 when it first won substantial audiences, in 
part by reorienting its displays and labels to address first the ordinary visitor 
and second the technical visitor, as well as students and specialists (like 
Mumford, who visited in preparation for his book) (Follett 1978, 98). 
The earliest sustained empirical discussion of market mechanisms that I know 
is the University of Chicago PhD dissertation that Edwin G. Nourse 
published in 1918. Attempting to understand the mechanisms and forces 
operating between farmers and city consumers to form prices, Nourse 
examined the Chicago Produce Market and drew attention to the unusual 
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value of focusing on a market city in contrast to earlier studies of markets in 
specific goods or classes of goods (Nourse 1918). Then worried by 
monopolies, Nourse soon addressed the relations between American 
agriculture and the European market  (Grether 1958). While there had been 
occasional references to the price mechanism in the nineteenth century, it 
became increasingly common for economists to write of price and market 
mechanisms after World War I. Sometimes looking back to Adam Smith’s 
discussion of the “higgling of the market,” their main aim was to articulate 
the role that prices play in the equilibrium of supply and demand in the 
subjective or marginalist approach to economics that had emerged from the 
1870s onwards, and they were often occasioned by postwar debates on 
planned economies and socialism. Together with Nourse’s care in navigating 
the distinction between specific markets, these debates (and later, responses 
to the stock market crash of 1929) explain why such references to mechanisms 
amongst economic experts commonly raised critical questions about the 
generality of economic concepts. As we shall see, they also often turned on 
the awkward status of economic theories and their simplification in lay 
circles. Collectively these circumstances make it difficult to evaluate the 
accuracy of Mitchell’s subtle point about “the economy,” but they also 
highlight its significance. 
Considering two very different accounts from 1921 will illustrate tensions of 
this kind between specific and general concepts amongst diverse audiences. 
The London School of Economics anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski 
began a paper for The Economic Journal by noting that for the Melanesian 
islanders he had studied “national economy does not exist,” if one means by 
that “a system of free competitive exchange of goods and services, with the 
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interplay of supply and demand determining value and regulating all 
economic life.” But he went on to argue against following the Leipzig 
professor of economic history Karl Bücher in assuming the only alternative 
was a pre-economic stage based on a single household satisfying their wants 
“without any more elaborate mechanism than division of labour according to 
sex, and an occasional spasmodic bit of barter.” Rather, Trobriand production, 
consumption and exchange were “socially organized and regulated by 
custom,” and governed by “a special system of traditional values.” 
Malinowski coined the term tribal economy to describe the new concept he 
had developed as a result of his fieldwork, and urged that comparative 
studies might elucidate “the nature of the economic mechanism of savage 
life” (Malinowski 1921, 12, 15). His writing illustrates an easy association 
between social mechanisms and economics, and a readiness to speak of a 
national economy – while arguing for a different form of economy. By 
contrast, in an account of risk and uncertainty later reprinted in an LSE series 
in 1933, the University of Iowa economist Frank Knight defined his discipline 
in terms of free enterprise, while also admitting this was a highly idealized 
conception. Writing that economics was the study of a particular form of 
wants-satisfying activity called free enterprise, which was prevalent in the 
western nations and “spread over the greater part of conduct,” he 
acknowledged immediately that it was “obviously not at all completely or 
perfectly competitive,” but asserted that just as clearly its general principles 
“are those of free competition” (Knight 1933 [1921], 9). Knight went on to 
stress the significance of recognising the assumptions underlying the 
application of the general principles of economics to complex facts, writing 
that neglecting this had led economic theorists to untenable and often vicious 
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deductions that naturally harmed the credibility of the science. Revealingly, 
Knight articulated this problem and its solution by developing at some length 
a comparison between theoretical economics and theoretical mechanics. 
Pointing to public appreciation of the limits of mechanics he argued it was 
necessary that “the contrast between these simplified [economic] assumptions 
and the complex facts of life be made as conspicuous and as familiar as has 
been done in mechanics” (Knight 1933 [1921], 9, 11). 
Knight’s work shows that analogies with theoretical mechanics could be 
productive in clarifying the nature of economic knowledge; a study of 
Friedrich Hayek’s distinctive understanding of markets will show that he 
referred to the rhetorical dimensions of mechanical discourse even as he 
asserted a stronger basis for his views. Post war debates about economic 
planning, the rise of the Soviet Union and later World War II were all central 
to the development of Hayek’s thought. Combatting the strong distinctions 
often assumed in post World War II histories of economics and common 
understandings of the emergence of neoliberalism, Johanna Bockman and Ben 
Jackson have insisted on the significance of constructive dialogue throughout 
the interwar period. Models of socialism and of markets were often used 
hand in hand methodologically, and sometimes, as in the earlier work of Leon 
Walras, Vilfredo Pareto and Enrico Barone, they were combined. Far from 
being regarded as essentially antagonistic, under certain assumptions and 
conditions, socialism and markets were even regarded as equivalent. Whole 
economies were modelled mathematically but they were rarely thought to 
represent the heterogeneous conditions of political economy in any full sense 
(Pareto, for example, turned to sociology towards the end of his life in order 
to understand why abstract mathematical theories did not work out in 
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practice). As Bockman notes, early Soviet thinkers like Bukharin were also 
deeply familiar with neoclassical thought, because it provided important 
models and tools for socialist approaches and had to be critiqued. Jackson’s 
close-grained study of the 1930s helpfully shows that leading neoliberal 
figures like Hayek at the London School of Economics, Walter Lippmann in 
New York and Herbert Simons in Chicago all reflected a similarly open 
perspective. Suspicious of the moral failures of nineteenth-century capitalism 
and liberalism, they emphasised value commitments shared with socialists, 
and also endorsed significant state regulation and redistribution (Jackson 
2010). Collectively this research therefore highlights still more strongly the 
importance of the transition that Hayek’s biographer Bruce Caldwell has 
charted, most evident in Hayek’s well-known papers of 1937 on “Economics 
and Knowledge,” and of 1945 on “The Use of Knowledge in Society” 
(Caldwell 2004). 
Soon after moving from Vienna to London, in 1933 Hayek offered a historical 
portrait of the fortunes of the economist that tied the poor reputation of the 
science to the difficulty of recognising the proper nature of its subject matter – 
which he called a “highly complicated mechanism,” but, following Ludwig 
von Mises, described more often as an “organism” (von Hayek 1933, 123 (for 
mechanism) and 123, 130-131 (organism)). In the 1937 paper in which he 
moved from thinking of markets in terms of the flow of goods, to knowledge, 
Hayek identified the problem that the perfect market that had to be assumed 
in equilibrium theories “must not be confined to the markets of all the 
individual commodities; the whole economic system must be assumed to be 
one perfect market in which everybody knows everything” (von Hayek 1937, 
44-45). He then focused on explaining how individuals would acquire this 
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knowledge, allowing that it was extremely difficult to say what assumptions 
were required to establish a tendency towards equilibrium and claim the 
analysis applied to the real world (von Hayek 1937, 47). Still more important 
was dealing with a division of knowledge, which was analogous to and as 
significant a problem as the division of labour; it was the really central 
problem of economics as a social science. Hayek was identifying the point he 
thought needed to be resolved in the gulf between perfect knowledge and 
planning, and spontaneous individuals, asking how fragmentary knowledge 
in different minds could bring about a result that would otherwise require a 
knowledge that no single person can possess. 
It was in 1945 that Hayek found a solution in the “price system” and wrote 
concretely and explicitly in terms of a general economic mechanism. The key 
elements of his view had in fact already been assembled a year earlier in his 
surprisingly influential argument against socialist planning, The Road to 
Serfdom, where they bore the explicitly moral perspective of that book’s 
political aims. There, Hayek described the price mechanism as impersonal 
and established an evocative contrast between on the one hand the price 
mechanism and impersonal forces of a competitive society, and on the other 
hand direct regulation by authority, the war machine, the state machine or the 
totalitarian machine. He argued that while people may submit to a suffering 
that could hit anyone (such as “the impersonal mechanism known by us as 
the price system”), it is much harder to submit to one resulting from the 
decision of an authority. “It may be bad to be just a cog in an impersonal 
machine,” he wrote, “but it is infinitely worse if we can no longer leave it, if 
we are tied to our place and to the superiors who have been chosen for us” 
(Hayek 1944, v, 27-29, 86, 112, on 36-37, 80) Hayek’s language shows that he 
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too associates mechanism generally with many of the negative connotations 
we have seen in earlier discussions, while also ascribing a distinctive moral 
advantage to “impersonal” mechanisms. 
In his paper on knowledge a year later, Hayek was able to explicitly treat the 
coordination of information on the scale of the entire economy. Giving a rich 
example of how consumers react to the increasing price of tin to save and 
direct resources elsewhere even without knowing what has made the metal 
scarce, Hayek described the effects shifting through the economic system and 
wrote “the whole acts as one market,” because limited individual fields of 
vision overlap sufficiently to pass on the relevant information. Now he wrote: 
It is more than a metaphor to describe the price system as a kind 
of machinery for registering change, or a system of 
telecommunications which enables individual producers to 
watch merely the movement of a few pointers, as an engineer 
might watch the hands of a few dials, in order to adjust their 
activities to changes of which they may never know more than 
is reflected in the price movement (Hayek 1945, 521,  cf. Hayek 
1944, 36-37). 
The argument that you can reconcile imperfect individual knowledges to an 
economic system through prices allowed Hayek to proclaim the whole as one 
market – at the same time that he described the role of prices as a 
comprehensive information mechanism. Hayek’s changing perspective nicely 
confirms Mitchell’s argument about the gradual rise of general concepts of the 
economy. With its delicate negotiation of tensions between merely 
metaphorical and material instances of mechanism, his discussion also 
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indicates the creative role of the heterogeneous and multiplying concepts of 
mechanisation that I have traced here. By 1944 and 1945, Hayek had artfully 
absorbed the 1930s technocratic engineer into his vision of the individual 
watching prices, finding a way to reconcile disparate economic systems and 
incorporate the idea of general planning within the concept of the market 
itself. 
Hayek’s next paragraph takes up the problem of formal generality, only to 
dismiss it. He allows that the adjustments probably never meet the perfection 
of knowledge required of equilibrium analysis, but suggests economists 
should not be blinded to the true function of the price mechanism by 
applying the misleading standard of the assumption of perfection. Then he 
goes on to perform the conceptual feat of deliberately leading his readers to 
re-evaluate their understanding of the price mechanism. Remarkably, the 
linguistic foundation for this work was to strip his account of the explicitly 
moral and evocative language he had used in 1944 – there is no spectre of 
either the impersonal or grim machinery of The Road to Serfdom – and then to 
reinvest the price mechanism with his own understanding of it as “marvel.” 
Hayek uses this term explicitly to shock people out of the complacency of 
typical understandings of prices, to now regard as marvellous the way the 
information of a rise in price alone leads thousands to respond appropriately 
to scarcity. 
It is revealing that one of our most significant historians of economics began 
his work investigating the relations between physics and economics with a 
book entitled Against Mechanisms (Mirowski 1988). Like Caldwell, Mirowski 
describes Hayek as naturalising the market in terms of information flow from 
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1945 onwards, drawing attention to the role of the Mont Pèlerin Society and 
other institutions to further Hayek’s political and intellectual aims (Mirowski 
2002, 232-41, 2007). In recent years extraordinary historical attention has been 
devoted to Hayek, and a new field of economic engineering has arisen around 
the idea of identifying desired outcomes and then constructing mechanisms 
(or institutions) to achieve them (Ashworth 2014, Caldwell 2004, 2016, 
Hodgson 1994, Lewis 2016, Mirowski 2007, Tuerck 1995, Maskin 2015). Yet at 
least in our studies of technology, historians of science have usually focused 
far more on the issues of identity raised on the borders of science and 
technology and pure and applied science, than on the engagement of 
industrial physics with its markets; something that the contributions to this 
issue will go some way towards addressing. Historians and sociologists have 
recently begun to explore the performative work that economists have 
achieved in creating markets, mostly considering financial institutions 
developed in recent decades (Callon 1998, MacKenzie, et al. 2007). I hope the 
present paper can clarify respects in which the interwar period may have 
been significant for changing understandings of markets and the free 
economy. Responding equally to profuse forms of mechanisation brought 
together in city streets and goods at the market, the valence of the machine, 
and the attraction of mechanisms, Hayek, for one, found a new 
accommodation to overcome the burden of perfection and find a general 
mechanism in prices. Exploring the extent to which understandings of 
mechanism are more or less than metaphor thus helps demonstrate the ways 
that mechanisms and the economy must be understood culturally, in order to 
modulate the diverse senses in which they are impersonal and marvellous or 
might express quite other relations. 
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Conclusion 
There are several important features about counter-posing the diverse 
accounts and fields and settings that I have tried to draw together so rapidly 
here. One is that many of the figures I have discussed considered themselves 
to be part of a common discussion and a continuous history. For all his 
lambast against physics, Spengler had read avidly in the subject in the course 
of his doctorate in philosophy; Chase had visited the Soviet Union and 
Bukharin in turn noted both his work and Spengler’s; socialists and 
neoliberals were in an intimate conversation through several decades. Yet as 
Omodeo has illustrated in a recent study of Bukharin, these connections have 
too often slipped from our understanding, partly because of the way they 
reached across disciplinary, national and political traditions that were 
pursued agonistically, sometimes throughout the interwar, post World War II 
and Cold War periods (Omodeo 2016). Extending our treatment of the Zeit- 
and Chrono-geist in more comprehensive and critical examinations of the 
historical authority and discursive context for contemporaries’ claims, we 
should be ready to follow such links and test them more thoroughly than we 
often do. 
I can point to both the scope and limitations of my own endeavour to 
establish interrelations between subjects usually treated separately by noting 
that in 1940 the anthropologist Melville Herskovits began the first major 
textbook dedicated to the emerging field of economic anthropology with a 
chapter entitled “Before the Machine.” He made the point that most people 
still live without machines and outlined the varied effects of industrial 
processes in a machine society before developing his comparative discussion 
of specific facets of economic activities amongst primitive peoples (Herskovits 
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1940). This paper has explored discourse on the machine to establish the 
coherence of thinking in terms of machine society and a machine age, but just 
as Herskovits pointed to a critical lacuna beyond machine society, I have 
emphasised difficult, creative ambiguities within it. The first section of this 
paper examined the rise of an international discourse on the machine and a 
machine age that was given a new inflection by the variety of forms of 
mechanisation pervading life, and by World War I. Authors discussing 
machines often moved between physics and mechanics in particular as an 
image of the intellectual life of science, and the engineer as the master of the 
machine, but they were also concerned with understanding industrial 
entrepreneurship. Tracing the generality of their discourse allows us to 
identify common themes structuring what have often been approached as 
distinct national contexts. The two final sections explored how artists and an 
economist responded to a profusion of machines and mechanisation with a 
creative emphasis on collage documenting the city in Dada and film, and the 
articulation of a new form of generality in the price system as an economic 
machinery – the free market economy. 
In the interwar period many recognised an ambiguously pervasive profusion 
of forms of mechanisation in the meeting of diverse systems, people and 
goods in city streets and markets. Perhaps this is mundane and everyday, 
caught in a documentary film. Perhaps it is threatening in its abstraction and 
desiccation, machined and rigid. Perhaps it is radiant or marvellous in its 
impersonal freedom. In the tensions between these possibilities I think we see 
the extraordinary novelty of the machine age, when modern life was possibly, 
projectively mechanical to such creative or destructive effect. 
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